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FOREWORD

Despite over a dozen years of talk, the Soviet and now
Russian military has not undergone a true military reform.
What did happen was a form of degeneration and
disintegration, but not a methodically planned and directed
transformation and/or adaptation to new conditions.
Consequently, defense policy, in all of its ramifications, has
remained essentially unreformed and remains an
impediment to Russia’s accommodation to today’s strategic
realities.
This study presents an assessment of Russian defense
policy as Russia has begun, in late 1997 and 1998, to grapple
with the enormous challenges that inhere in the process of
military reform. The outcome of what can only be a
protracted process will have profound implications, not only
for Russia, but for its neighbors and partners, chief among
them being the United States. Given the coincidence of this
reform process with what many believe to be a revolution in
military affairs and the continuing urgency of reducing
nuclear threats, the ongoing observation of Russian
military policies remains very important for the United
States.
The Strategic Studies Institute offers this report on
Russian military reform to contribute further to the
analysis of the critical issues at stake in the process.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

The Russian armed forces, by all accounts, are fast
approaching a point of no return. The crisis in the armed
forces is directly traceable to the policies of the Yeltsin
government which have alternated among politicization,
fragmentation of those forces into multiple, contending
militaries, and the creation of a quasi-authoritarian
political process where military policy is decided by
irregular institutions that account to and answer to nobody
other than President Yeltsin. Similar problems plague the
defense economy which is probably still too large and at the
same time misdirected, while being unable to support the
forces presently under arms. In any case, nobody knows how
many men are under arms or the cost of maintaining them,
or where defense allocations go.
Not surprisingly, military policy and the so-called
current military reform more resemble bureaucratic
exercises in turf-grabbing or the court politics of the Tsars
then they do real reform. While efforts are underway to
downsize the armed forces, spend less on them, and revamp
the force structure, these moves seem driven by concerns
other than strategic rationality. Moreover, they threaten to
bring about a further devolution of central power to the
regions and heightened possibilities for state fragmentation.
At the same time, Russian writing on both nuclear and
information war (IW) continues to manifest the same kinds
of inability to think rationally and coherently about
strategy and could lead the government to adopt military
policies that will lead to disaster and which are misapplied
to the real threats that Russia faces. Russian nuclear policy
and much, but not all, thinking about information warfare
could either lead to a military catastrophe or, in the case of
IW, to an internal civil war. In either case, the only answer
to the crisis of the armed forces and of the state is more, not
less, democracy, and a truly stable defense establishment
v

tailored to the real economic needs and capacities of the
country. Unhappily, neither of these possibilities seems
likely to be realized anytime soon.
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RUSSIA'S ARMED FORCES
ON THE BRINK OF REFORM

In September 1996, Sergei Rogov, director of Russia's
Institute of the USA and Canada (ISKAN), told a conference
on U.S.- Russian relations that while he spoke for himself
and was not responsible for anybody else, “my government
is also responsible for nothing.” Nowhere is this more true
than in defense policy.
Russian defense policy is a study in failure. Russia has
failed to develop a coherent governmental structure to make
and implement effective or sensible defense policy. It has
not built effective, civilian, democratic control of its multiple
militaries and the burgeoning number of paramilitary and
privately controlled armed forces. It has neither developed
nor upheld a concept of Russian national interests or a
strategy for defending them commensurate with Russia's
real potential and forces. It has neither created forces that
can counter threats to Russia's national interests, nor
defined either the threats or those interests.
Instead, Boris Yeltsin has created a system of multiple
militaries, a military pluralism, to secure his power as a
virtual autocrat above an increasingly visible financialbureaucratic oligarchy. This system displays a growing
privatization of the state and of the means of public violence
that resembles trends in failing African or Third World
states.1 This privatization of the state appears in the efforts
of private, sectoral, or institutional players who use the
multiple armed forces and accessories of public power for
private, as opposed to national, interests for which they
have scant regard. Many elites view public office as merely
an opportunity to advance private interests that are
commingled with their public position and responsibilities.
And this privatization of the state, as a phenomenon, can be
analyzed separately from the concurrent and overlapping
criminalization of the state and society. Criminalization
1

alone could, if unchecked, cause the state to disintegrate. 2
Thus both it and privatization threaten the continuing
existence of the state.
The media exemplifies this fusion of public and private
interests and relates to the structure of armed power as
well. The media is increasingly concentrated in the hands of
a few well-connected bankers and financiers, some of whom
also enjoy high office. This concentration of power even
includes the State Television Network (ORT), leading
newspapers, and numerous uncounted private militaries.
Thus, an unholy conglomeration of rival clans of linked
media, business, Mafia, military, or paramilitary interests
is developing. This privatization of the means of public
violence and of public power demonstrates the failure of
Russian state-building, for the monopoly of legitimate
public violence is the hallmark of the state. The absence of
that monopoly signifies an extreme crisis. And the linkages
among all sectors of this fragmented elite show that the
crisis transcends civil-military relations. Therefore Russia
displays processes that have caused other states to
disintegrate: privatization of public violence, failures in
state-building and elite fragmentation. Further compounding
these failures is the fact that in outlying areas such as the
North Caucasus, and even in the Far East, local armed
forces are assembling under the auspices of regional or
republican governments because Moscow cannot or will not
protect those areas or because of the local governor's revolt
against Moscow as in Primorskii Krai (the Maritime
Province). 3
Yeltsin and his retinue are now reaping their bitter
harvest. Yeltsin's autocratic attempt to impose an unsound
military reform upon the armed forces and evade any
parliamentary accountability and scrutiny of his attempts
to politicize the multiple militaries has led the popular
general and Duma member, Lev Rokhlin, to organize an
opposition movement of serving military personnel,
Yeltsin's political foes, and citizens whose avowed goal is to
oust Yeltsin and his government, allegedly by constitutional
2

means. Rokhlin's movement has united the anti-reform
opposition, organized chapters across Russia, and called on
soldiers and officers to disobey Yeltsin. While the specter of
a Duma member who is a general organizing such a
movement with the Communists and quasi-Fascists is
alarming, Rokhlin's withering critique of Yeltsin's nonaccountability to the Duma is democratically right on
target.4 Although such opposition would be illegitimate in a
law-governed state, Yeltsin's Russia is not such a state. And
it is largely Yeltsin's fault that the military and state have
reached this impasse. As Russia's best known defense
correspondent, Pavel Felgengauer, writes, “Today the
Defense Ministry is a pyramid of purely military staffs and
administrations whose inner workings are hidden from the
public and beyond the control of the political leadership.” 5
Thus Rokhlin's movement not only underscores the
utter lack of executive accountability to law and
parliamentary scrutiny, it also highlights Yeltsin's failures
in civil-military relations. Rokhlin's movement is only the
latest and perhaps most dangerous instance of many cases
where Yeltsin's effort to politicize, fragment, and
marginalize the armed forces has bred repeated instances of
insubordination. More broadly, given the pervasive elite
fragmentation, lawlessness, and “deinstitutionalization” of
Russian governance, Rokhlin's movement also highlights
the continuing fragility of democratic institutions and
absence of a consensus on vital foundational issues of
Russian politics.
Under these conditions, the military's utility as a
defender of Russia's interests is greatly, if not completely
compromised. The regular army can neither defend
Russia's integrity nor help integrate the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), Russia's main foreign policy goal.
Russia remains bogged down in many protracted
“peacemaking” operations, most of which are far from
political resolution. In none of these conflicts are Russian
forces impartial peacemakers or peacekeepers. Rather they
actively support one or another political side in these
3

contests, guaranteeing their presence for a long time to
come. Yet, increasingly this burden is insupportable
politically, strategically, and economically. Nor is military
reform possible with so many forces engaged in operations.
These incomplete operations and the Chechen war have
forced a Russian military retreat from Central Asia and the
Caucasus. Consequently, it is difficult to see what concrete
and lasting benefits or interests these adventures have
served. 6 Although one could argue that military
intervention abroad prevented the spread of these wars to
Russia, Moscow has squandered most of the time it gained
and is now importing violence into the North Caucasus,
rendering such an assertion moot at best.
Despite its earlier successes in dividing Georgia and
Moldova, Russia is now a trapped gendarme in protracted,
unwinnable ethnic wars on its frontiers. Therefore Russian
objectives and capabilities remain grossly unbalanced and
reflect the lack of national strategy or of sound military
policy. While new imperial adventures must be ruled out
along with operations in the CIS above the level of minor,
brief police actions, we cannot be sure that Moscow fully
understands this and/or can act accordingly. The one thing
we cannot be certain of is the most important one, namely
the predictability of Russian security policy.
For example, Moscow cannot devise credible responses
to larger-scale conventional contingencies on or inside its
frontiers. Russia's current doctrine instead threatens
nuclear first-strikes in purely conventional and even lowlevel contingencies. Moscow also cannot confront the
exigencies of either the Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA) or Information Warfare (IW). Indeed, there are signs
that Russian writers' concept of IW could easily degenerate
into a pretext for a new round of internal political strife. Or
else, Russia's failure to keep up with it could lead to terrible
military outcomes due to Russia's relative backwardness.
Therefore Russian politics, and particularly military
politics, resemble court and bureaucratic politics, with
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endless personal conspiracies, the hallmark of a semidespotic oligarchy under a Tsar with few institutional
anchors in society, and an endless search for personal and
departmental advantage. Military policy, including efforts
at reform, more nearly resemble classic manifestations of
bureaucratic politics of turf-building and intrigues against
rival officials, factions, etc. than modern democratic politics.
Hence much of the reform drive merely conceals power
grabs and endless turf-grabbing to satisfy personal or
departmental interests. National interests, of which few if
any elites have any concept, count for little or nothing.
Accordingly, in too many respects Yeltsin's system and
policies uncannily resemble those of the later Tsars as
Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov recently admitted. 7
Since the military crisis is merely part of the state's general
crisis, the nature of elite linkages among military,
paramilitary, political, business, and media chains means
that a settling of scores, i.e., purges (even murder) and a
search for internal enemies, remains a constant and
conceivable temptation. These trends bespeak a protracted
crisis of the state and society with no easy way out of this
impasse.
Military Politics.
Former Defense Minister Igor Rodionov conceded that
Russia's military instruments are useless. The chains of
command are broken and split into rival factions. There is
no rule of law, systematic or regularized procedure for
making and implementing policy decisions, or any
accountability to the Duma or the Judiciary. 8 Yeltsin has
deliberately divided governing institutions so that nobody
can establish a unified policy process and direct the
government. The many diverse police and security forces
have overlapping functions and renewed extra-legal powers
while their leaders extol the KGB's esprit de corps. 9 And
since nothing has replaced the old party Main Political
Administration as a control instrument, the Federal
Security Service (FSB), has filled this vacuum, penetrated
5

the army and openly and regularly spies on it. 10 Indeed, it
openly boasts about its intense and highly visible scrutiny of
Rokhlin's movement. 11
There are an estimated 15-24 formal organizations of
armed forces including the paramilitary Cossack Voiska
(orders), but not counting the many private security firms or
governmental guards hired out to big banks, businesses,
and even to Mafia leaders. 12 Thus we cannot systematically
count Russia's armed, police, or paramilitary forces, many
of which have overlapping internal and external missions. 13
These military organizations comprise an estimated 3-4
million men. But nobody knows how many men are under
arms, bear arms professionally, or where defense allocations
go once the Duma approves them. Any analysis of these
questions by all experts must remain speculative for even
the ministries cannot or will not track these numbers. Nor
will the Ministry of Defense (MOD) or other ministries tell
anyone how they spend their monies. Therefore nobody can
guess at the extent of the true military burden Russia has
carried since 1992 except to guess that it remains a crushing
one. Probably the MOD itself does not know where or how
the money goes. So the MOD remains wholly unaccountable
to legislative or even executive scrutiny, a fact that has
enraged the opposition and perhaps Yeltsin, too. 14 Indeed,
opacity remains the military economy's distinguishing
characteristic. 15
Each military institution has its own administration
and chain of command which intersect only at Yeltsin or his
personal chancellery which are unaccountable to the Duma
and any legal/judicial standard. These military organizations
exist, not on the basis of a regular state budget, but
essentially from Yeltsin's or the cabinet's largess, or offbudget expenditures. Hence, the defense and state
budgetary process are wholly politicized beyond any legal
accountability and there is neither public debate nor a
public record of defense spending. 16 While the militaries'
true spending and budget remain hidden from public or
legislative scrutiny, they still arguably get too much money
6

and resources (which are stolen or misdirected) rather than
not enough despite the real and painful budget cuts of 199496. Thus Russia produces five different fighter planes. One
could also contend that Moscow simply does not know what
it is doing in devising and implementing the military
budget. Sadly, these explanations are not mutually
exclusive. 17
While the economy remains excessively militarized,
forces are rewarded to the degree that their political
reliability is essential or questionable. The Ministry of
Interior (MVD), upon whose performance the regime's
internal security depends, is pampered. While the army
starves, the MVD and the Presidential Guard (GUO) are
lavishly rewarded. Indeed the MVD's functions now overlap
with those of the police, intelligence, and investigative
services. The MVD operates a force of 20 divisions and 29
brigades (some 250,000 men) under regulations which
remain pretty much what they were under Alexander I,
1801-1825. 18
Rodionov's predecessor, General Pavel Grachev,
deliberately politicized the Ministry of Defense at Yeltsin's
order, subjecting Russian regular forces to Yeltsin's
demand for active participation in partisan politics. 19
Accordingly, we should not fear a Pinochet, Rokhlin, or
other forms of Bonapartism, but rather political leaders'
efforts to use the various armed forces for partisan
advantage. All contenders for political power now fight to
control the multiple militaries and key state agencies. For
example, because the regular armed forces cannot survive
on their allocations, private agents who show political
ambition, e.g., the Mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, support
the Black Sea Fleet, or the building of a new nuclear
powered submarine in Severodvinsk, signifying this
privatization of public violence. 20
All these militaries are thoroughly corrupted and
brutalized. Troops starve, freeze, beg, commit crimes or
suicide while corrupt officers go free, brutalize their
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subordinates, or play partisan politics. Russia cannot afford
either to maintain, demobilize and/or professionalize the
army. Nor can it raise the taxes or funds from privatizing
industries to support or pay the armed forces. 21 Soldiers live
like serfs in an anomic and demoralizing limbo of crime,
embitterment, corruption, hazing, abuse, violence, and
politicization that could explode at any time and already
adds to the crime rate. 22
The militaries participate in partisan politics and
foreign policy, attack state policy, and form coalitions with
disaffected regional leaders with impunity. Even before
Rokhlin's election to the Duma in 1995, serving officers in
the Duma publicly criticized the government on major
issues of foreign and defense policy. And they were
subsequently promoted! 23
Yeltsin has responded to the military crisis by forming
new extra-legal and extra-constitutional commissions to
usurp existing state functions of the Ministry of Defense.
This is an ancient Tsarist and Soviet method of building
autocratic and even dictatorial states, even if ostensibly this
authoritarianism is to provide for a democratic society.
These commissions were led by Deputy Premier Anatoly
Chubais and former Defense Council Secretary Yuri
Baturin, and were supposed to oversee the Ministry of
Defense and bypass the Ministry’s power in preparing
military reform. Yeltsin has since created new commissions
and reinvigorated the defense inspectorate to once again
divide and rule over the entire defense policy process. Since
1996 such actions have been linked to Yeltsin's and
Chubais' efforts to create a strong state freed from any social
restraints. Some have welcomed this program as a new
authoritarianism. 24
Yeltsin and Chubais have also tried to find funds for
paying the military's social arrears (salaries, benefits,
pensions) either from privatization programs or from arms
sales. Since those revenues were originally earmarked for
the state's and defense industry's economic recovery, the
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fact that officials now talk of dumping weapons abroad to
pay for those costs and the corruption of the privatization
process means that Russia, despite talk to the contrary, still
has neither a growth strategy nor a strategy for restoring
defense industry. Nor can arms sales actually restore either
the armed forces or the defense industry. The newest arms
deal with Indonesia of $1 billion for SU-30 fighters and MI17 helicopters will be compensated only in countertrade.
Nobody will really see the proceeds of that sale.
Future sales will probably go the same way or at
knockdown prices because the world arms market is a
buyers market and buyers can demand technology and
production transfer as part of the deal, undermining
Russia's lingering comparative advantages. Hence there
already is not enough money to pay for professionalization
and obtain a quality army rather than the disintegrating
forces we now see. Nor can Russia maintain the army at
even 80 percent of its assigned level plus the other military
forces without large numbers of monthly conscripts. 25 This
realization has begun to sink in on the new Defense
Minister, General Igor Sergeev, the former commander in
chief of Russian nuclear forces, especially as he contemplates
the 1998 draft budget which further slashes investment and
cannot meet the military's minimum needs. A new round of
budgetary sequestration and the strangling of civil and
military investment, not to mention arrears, is all too likely.
And such practices hinder rather than reinforce progress
toward democracy.
Worse yet, the new crisis originating in the 1997 crash of
Asian economies means that there will be no economic
growth in 1998, insufficient means to pay the already
ballooning arrears to soldiers and workers, and no or few
Asian markets for Russian arms manufacturers. Thus one
of the by-products of the Asian crisis is the further
evisceration of Russia's economy and defense sector.
Clearly nobody in power is either truly serious or
knowledgeable about the military or economic elements of a
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comprehensive, intelligent military reform. There has not
been effective reform in 1997 even though one has been
decreed, for it is clear, and indeed conceded, that the MOD
staff and the General Staff are waiting out these decrees
and leaders are already backtracking on reform. For
example, a professional army by 2005 has already been
ruled out for the following reasons. Sergeev has already said
publicly that unless a 50 percent raise in salaries for officers
(and presumably soldiers, too) occurs, nobody will want to
serve and the reform will fail. Although the armed forces are
now largely contract soldiers, they suffer from serious
moral, psychological, mental, and physical defects that
undermine quality. Thus he suggests the incentive
structure must be comprehensively reformed.
Since that cannot happen under present economic
conditions, soldiers and officers will essentially be thrown
out on the street without their lawful benefits. Moreover,
the political process and the command structure will not be
changed significantly except under duress. As it is, the
reform proposals discussed below by Minister of Defense
General Igor Sergeev, former CINC of the Strategic Rocket
Forces, and Chief of Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin reveal
a very high degree of purely departmental and personal
motives.
None of these reforms will benefit the rank and file who
will once again be victimized financially. The regime will
pay only 3.5 percent of the annual budget to the armed
forces and expects to raise the money for reform by selling
off state owned civilian and military industries and firms to
private bidders. Those buyers invariably pay much less
than these firms are worth, evade taxes, which the regime
cannot collect, and thus prevent any real economic growth
from occurring. The government also hopes to sell military
infrastructure and surplus but those figures cannot make
up the difference. And arms sales, the third alternative for
fund-raising, is already compromised.
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Accordingly, no rational national security strategy or
consensus exists despite some common moods. Profound
policy differences preclude any coherent policy and
reinforce institutional fragmentation. The trends outlined
above do not only resemble those of failing states, they could
abet a trend towards regional warlordism as in Primorskii
Krai (the Maritime Province), now nicknamed Palermo on
the Pacific. Already regional and local governments
increasingly must assume the burden of maintaining the
armed forces, a relationship that forges ties of mutual
dependence among both groups at the expense of the
center.26
Yeltsin's apparently consciously malign neglect of the
army has helped bring this about. Clearly no modern,
professional, democratic, and competent army is possible
without major reform and democratization. The military
reform, envisioned in the July 1997 decrees, now focuses on
economics, and bizarre plans for force structure rather than
on creating a democratic state or command structure which
can control defense policies. Rodionov and the former Chief
of Staff, General Viktor Samsonov, were dumped because
they would not try to shrink the army, modernize it, and
retire officers without their legal compensation and the
requisite investment in modernization. This state spending
would have broken the budget. Nor did they believe that the
army could be professionalized anytime soon. Apparently
now neither does anyone else. 27 Thus these two generals
resisted a trend that would force much more accountability
of the officer corps but probably ruin the armed forces as a
reliable instrument of national defense. 28 They also held
out, quite irrationally, for a threat assessment on a global
scale as in the USSR, a program that would destroy the
state, not to mention the army, if carried out.
The reformers, on the other hand, led by Baturin,
Chubais, and Nemtsov, demand that the army live within
an even more constrained budget and sack generals. But
whereas Rodionov demanded an end to the multiple
militaries, they refused to undermine the power of the
11

MVD, the army's strongest rival and their ultimate
argument in the struggle for power. Although they do
reportedly want to dismiss Kulikov, they want the MVD's
power for themselves. 29 Nor will they democratize civilmilitary relations; instead they will probably further
politicize them. While the MVD may be forced to undergo
structural reform as Kvashnin wants, Kulikov will not
likely willingly turn it over to his political enemies, Chubais
and Nemtsov. Nor will Chubais' faction accept the notion
that military reform is not cost-free. 30 Since they will not
spend the needed funds and have appointed Sergeev
Defense Minister, the army will continue to suffer vis-à-vis
the MVD and the nuclear forces. Indeed, the weight of
current policy suggests an overwhelming reliance on
nuclear forces for a host of military-political contingencies
that these forces cannot effectively confront.
The state of the regular and military economies dictates
such a solution. Defense conversion has failed spectacularly.
But though outlays have fallen, the economy remains
excessively militarized. Defense spending and procurement
appears oriented towards nuclear war scenarios and more
R&D to exploit the RMA: e.g., new, mobile based ICBM's,
SLBM's, investments in strategic ASW, R&D in conventional and strategic C 3I systems, and new fighter planes. 31
But since internal procurement will be impossible until
2005 because of budgetary stringency, defense industry is
now being unleashed to export even state-of-the-art
systems globally, evidently without state controls. 32
Russia's putative rivals or their own regional rivals (China,
India, South Korea, Indonesia, Iran) can obtain high-class
weapons and systems relatively cheaply since the arms
business is now a buyer's market. They can also compel
Moscow and other suppliers to offer them offsets to build
their own weapons and further reduce sellers' leverage over
them. 33 Although many of these states are Russia's
potential enemies, the government sees no conventional or
nuclear threat at the higher end of the spectrum of warfare
for another 8-10 years. 34
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Strategy and Operations.
In this context, past policy's adventurism and strategic
dead ends are hardly surprising. Chechnya exemplifies the
former, an adventure that made Moscow the strategic
center of gravity, lost Chechnya to its control, and has
undermined key foreign policy objectives in Ukraine,
Transcaucasia, and elsewhere. The North Caucasus is now
more turbulent than before the Chechen war, which
revealed that Moscow cannot exercise effective control over
regional governments or maintain a competent army.
Russia's protracted peacemaking operations add to this
depressing picture. While they arguably prevented bad
situations from worsening and becoming bigger threats to
Russia, beyond emplacing troops, Moscow does not know
how to establish durable peace settlements that safeguard
its interests while easing its military burdens. In Tajikistan
it has had to retreat and support power-sharing with the
rebels. In Abkhazia Russia is caught between Georgian
threats to repeal the invitation to Russian forces and its
demands for resettlement of Georgian refugees, a process
that would fatally undermine Abkhaz aspirations to
independence. Russia, as regional gendarme, could be
blamed and caught between unreconciled ethnic forces who
could easily resume hostilities among themselves. Since
Georgia is vital to Russia’s interest in a Transcaucasian
hegemony, but the forces available to Moscow cannot
maintain order, the whole region could either elude Russian
control or break out into open warfare. Therefore Yeltsin
had to broker a peace process that the other parties had
started, due to their understanding of Russia's imperial
tendencies, or face threats of renewed war. 35
In Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia broke the Tashkent
collective security treaty with all CIS members including
Azerbaijan, covertly ran over a billion dollars of arms to
Armenia, coerced Armenia into granting it bases, and
repeatedly threatened Azerbaijan. Yet no settlement is in
sight, and Western influence is growing in Georgia and
13

Azerbaijan. Though Armenia may resume hostilities, it will
probably be denied any true victory as long as Western oil
interests now play a major regional role. Here too, Moscow's
failed economic reconstruction limits Russia only to a
regional policy of military interventionism that cannot
effectively sustain its political or economic objectives. Hence
the outcome is a protracted, prolonged, and volatile conflict
situation. Moscow may instigate acts of obstruction and
benefit from the ensuing Western frustration, but it will not
achieve tangible material gains or lasting security thereby.
In Central Asia and around Chechnya, not only is the
army in retreat, Moscow, the Border Troops led by General
Andrei Nikolaev, and Kulikov also seem constantly tempted
to use local Cossack paramilitaries with an atavistic
imperialist outlook for patrolling the border and to threaten
Kazakstan and Chechnya. 36 The use of such forces and of
the Ussuri Cossacks by Governor Yevgeny Nazdratenko to
defy Moscow's orders in the Far East underscores the
general loss of control over paramilitary forces. Furthermore these and other uncontrolled forces could easily be
incited to start something that Moscow would have to join,
but could not finish. 37
Finally, Kulikov has successfully campaigned for using
the army domestically, along with the MVD, against
insurgencies and all kinds of undefined threats to political
stability. 38 Surveys tell us that army officers are very
dubious, if not angry, about such missions, and conceivably
might refuse to quell them. This would risk internal
stability. 39 But these missions are written into Russian
doctrine and reflect Yeltsin's determination to politicize the
army for domestic purposes. Hence lack of control and of
effectively disciplined forces could trigger another war
endangering Russia's own stability and integrity.
Nuclear Issues.
Absent usable conventional forces, Russia has few
options other than the nuclear one. Moscow now advertises
14

its readiness to launch even preemptive first-strikes
against adversaries who are allied to nuclear powers,
against conventional strikes on power plants, C 3I targets, or
nuclear installations. 40 More recently, Baturin's January
1997 reform plan, which could become a basis for the new
doctrinal guidance given Sergeev's mandate and predilections for emphasizing the nuclear forces, demonstrates that
even in expanding ethnopolitical conflicts nuclear options
remain distinctly possible. Russia, when confronting local
wars that expand, due to outside assistance, into large-scale
conventional wars, reserves the right to use nuclear
weapons as first strike and preemptive weapons. This
allegedly limited first strike serves to regain escalation
dominance and force a return to the status quo. 41
For 40 years Soviet and Russian writers stridently
insisted that limited nuclear war was impossible. We now
know that this was because Moscow had relatively tenuous
controls over its second strike capabilities and was
uncertain that they would survive a first-strike intact. 42
Russia's first-strike was its only strike and entailed
launching thousands of warheads. If anything, controls
have eroded, and most existing nuclear weapons are
diminishing assets that must be replaced by 2003-2007. 43
Lastly, Russia retains a launch on warning system,
meaning that it will launch nuclear weapons, not on actual
attack, but if it perceives one to be in progress, rightly or
wrongly. Since its military experts expect a surprise attack,
and its early warning and air defense have significantly
degraded since 1991, the possibilities for erroneous launch
are high.
These facts have two implications, not counting the
danger of rogue actions. First, there is growing danger of
accidental or unintended launches due to failure to
distinguish real from false enemy launches. Second,
Moscow could escalate a conventional war way out of control
in the crazy belief that nuclear strikes can somehow limit
warfare and give it escalation control, despite 40 years of
contrary argument, assertion, and policy. For example,
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there might be those tempted to reply to what they believe is
an information attack by such means. Since an information
attack or the perception of it is one of the easiest things in
the world to misread, a nuclear first strike, a move out of all
proportion, is hardly inconceivable. In January 1995, for
instance, Russia almost launched a nuclear strike at a
Norwegian weather rocket.
Here again strategic means and strategic interests
remain disconnected, another outcome of the failure to
create adequate political mechanisms for the making of
strategy, defense policy, and overarching definitions of
national interests. Moscow faces the choice of going nuclear
and risking mutual suicide for purely smaller, conventional
conflicts, or of losing those conflicts for lack of usable
general forces. This reliance on nuclear weapons can only
weaken confidence in Russian policy and power's ability to
achieve Russia's self-proclaimed interests or to maintain
regional or global peace.
The So-Called Military Reform.
Military reform is clearly necessary, but while the issue
has been on the agenda since Brezhnev, we still await
effective reform. Sergeev actually has said that his plans
include ideas going back as far as Brezhnev's last Chief of
Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov! 44 In July 1997, Yeltsin
issued several decrees intended as the first signs of military
reform. If implemented, they could have lasting and major
significance for Russia and its multiple armed forces.
However, these decrees also reflect the political struggles
around the armed forces where each of the key players has
different goals for them, a sure sign of impending failure.
Furthermore, the national security concept and reform
plan were supposed to be out originally by June 25, 1997.
The latest story is that they will appear in early 1998.
Obviously there is a serious struggle occurring here and
Yeltsin has already made side deals with forces that breach
the principles of true reform, thereby casting doubt on the
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whole process. Furthermore the ongoing reform process
may turn out to be at variance with the eventual doctrinal
product which is supposed to function as guidance for threat
assessment and force building. Indeed, though everyone
concedes that local wars and internal threats are the most
vital ones facing Russia, allocations go to SSBNs, Strategic
ASW, fighter planes and ICBMs, as well as strategic nuclear
C2 exercises while the army cannot train above regimental
levels if that. Clearly this disparity reflects a deeper
malaise.
Therefore to understand the decrees' and the reform
process' significance we must first grasp the goals the
authors of these decrees have in mind. Sergeev sees seven
elements to the reform plan.

•

First, the blueprint embodied in the national security
concept examines threats to Russian security and
concludes no direct military threats up to the level of
“wide-scale war” exist until 2005. Until then the
nuclear forces—Sergeev's former command—guarantee security and stability.

•

Second, on the basis of an economic-demographic
survey, based on the assumption that growth will
begin at a rate of about 2 percent in 1998, decisions
about manning the army and investing in defense
industry are now being taken. We may note that this
planning basis is already invalid—due to the stock
market and financial crisis stemming from Russia’s
vulnerability to the Asian-generated financial crisis
that began in late 1997—as are the results that flow
from it, another sure sign of failure to achieve the
reforms' goals.

•

Third, an assessment of the armed forces' required
combat potential, based on Yeltsin's 3.5 percent of
GNP decree, is now underway.
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•

Fourth, Sergeev also hopes to give more precise
definition of the other forces' missions in order to
optimize them. He wants to eliminate duplicate
structures, unify combat training, the rear services,
and other organizations, while not encroaching on
their legitimate functions.

•

Fifth, one of the real obstacles is that defense industry
cannot provide orders in full for the existing 2000
defense enterprises. Therefore a new conversion
program is needed. Russia now sells weapons abroad
for less than it costs to buy them at home! Given the
lamentable history of the previous conversion
program, this is a confession of despair.

•

The sixth element of the program is to reconsider the
needs of the mobilization program. The Soviet
economy stored vast resources for perpetual
mobilization, a major factor in the ultimate collapse of
the Soviet war machine. Yeltsin has freed the
factories from the need to maintain these stocks or at
least has so decreed, but it is unclear what capacities
and resources are needed for mobilization or what
that would entail.

•

Finally, the reform plan must match the optimum
feasible levels of economic development and the
military threat that the government might perceive.

In addition, the reform plan Sergeev envisages has
several key aspects or objectives to it.

•

The military should end up at about 1.2 million men,
down from 1.7 million (it is not clear whether these
figures mean billets or authorized numbers of troops)
and the ground forces are to be cut in half, from
420,000 to 200,000.

•

These new forces are to make the transition to an allvolunteer force of men who join for professional
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reasons, but later than Yeltsin's target of the year
2000.

•

Military districts will be replaced with operational or
territorial joint commands where the commanders
will have authority over all services deployed in their
boundaries, possibly including the other armed forces
as well.

•

Available forces will be concentrated on forming
several full-strength, combat ready divisions to be
dispersed among the four operational-strategic
directions [Napravleniya] (the new title for these
territorial commands).

•

The air and air defense forces will be amalgamated
and the strategic missile, space and space defense
forces will be amalgamated into a single service, too.

•

The four naval fleets and Caspian Flotilla will be
preserved in their reduced state but obtain limited
missions, probably providing combat stability for
SSBNs, strategic ASW missions, and coastal defense.

•

A strong strategic nuclear force will remain as the
main deterrent to all sorts of external aggression and
threats.

•

The government will undertake major reductions in
the military bureaucracy in Moscow, cut generals'
positions and military academies.

•

By the year 2005 Sergeev hopes to increase the
amount spent on procurement and R&D to 40 percent
of the defense budget from its current 12 percent.

•

Sergeev aims to triple the amount spent on
procurement by 2001 and by 4.5 times by 2005
allowing for replacement of 5 percent of weapons
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annually until 2025 so that the forces will be wholly
reequipped with modern weaponry and technology.

•

Increase per capita funding for training by a factor of
12 starting in 1998.

•

Double officers' salaries by 2001 and by 2.5 times by
2005.45

Conscripts will presumably join the armed forces, MVD,
or Border Troops, but not the other paramilitary
organizations. The Border Troops will become regional
directorates, give up their heavier arms, disband large
units, and perhaps undergo a substantial civilianization.
Troops of the Emergency Situations Military may become a
State Rescue Service, relying more on MOD forces in special
engineering and WMD defense. And the Internal Troops are
supposed to undergo further reductions to a level of 220,000
from the present estimated 257,000. 46 As we have seen,
these goals are already in deep trouble.
Kvashnin, however, has rather broader personal goals.
He wants to establish six territorial formations or districts
(Moscow, North Caucasus, Leningrad, Siberia, Far East
and Urals) for all the power ministries and their forces on a
unified basis. Military districts should be standard size with
no overlap or opportunities for the MVD or other forces to
have multiple districts that do not correspond with the
army's districts. He believes this should allow for a more
orderly and coherent devolution of policy allowing the
regions to come into their own and seems to look rather
favorably on regionalism. However, in all these districts, the
regional collegial body overseeing and coordinating all these
forces should be the General Staff which he leads. Under
presidential authority the General Staff will see to it that all
these forces do not overstep their functions and missions
and will seek to unify their infrastructure. As a sign of this
program, Kvashnin offered a draft reform program that
would consolidate all the other militaries under his control.
This draft, submitted as part of the MOD's reform concept,
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contains guidelines on how to reform the other services, the
creation of unified inter-departmental control, planning,
and logistics departments inside the MOD. The other armed
forces will have permanent representatives in the General
Staff of the Defense Ministry so that the General Staff can
exercise unhampered daily operational control in wartime
and peacetime over these forces. 47 Thus it will assume a new
and unprecedented responsibility that it has never had in
modern Russian/Soviet history.
But against his efforts even to unify the Border Troops
and Internal Troops under the General Staff, their leaders
and other power ministries have coalesced to demand that
not one soldier be downsized without full payment of his
legally entitled compensation, a move which would break
the budget and reform. Furthermore, this draft, like earlier
MOD plans, was not shown to the Defense Council which,
under Andrei Kokoshin, has united with all the other
service chiefs to fight this so-called reform plan, which is
merely one more bureaucratic political ploy rather than a
mature concept for military organization. Rather than
accept what it calls an unbalanced and badly prepared
document, the Defense Council is considering other
alternatives, including an at least paper demilitarization of
the other services and forces, renaming and converting
them into paramilitary, police organizations that are
unworthy of MOD scrutiny. Thus the reform struggle is now
heating up further along the lines of bureaucratic politics. 48
Kulikov, too, has offered at least two different projects to
coordinate all crime-fighting forces under the MVD and has
pushed these proposals repeatedly. 49
Kvashnin's openly self-interested proposals illustrate
the turf war aspects of the reform process. Sergeev's plans
are similar. They will give his forces access to the space
forces and their access to lucrative foreign contracts for
satellites and the boosting of various payloads into outer
space while depriving other services of such outside
funding. Kulikov continues to make his own proposals for a
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rather different reform. And Nikolayev of the Border Troops
makes his own side deals with Yeltsin.
Accordingly, each of the reform's main authors sees in it,
not only a way to overcome existing defects, but even more a
way to augment their turf and power. Thus military reform
is a true paradigm of the factional, bureaucratic, or more
precisely court, politics around Yeltsin. Therefore, despite
the supposed content of the decrees from July 1997 and the
forthcoming security concept, the actual goals of the reform
have little to do in reality with creating a sound military
machine.
Those actual goals are:

•

To continue the tradition of multiple politicized
armed forces whose distinguishing criteria is their
personal loyalty to Yeltsin and his current retinue.
The point of this operation in political terms is also to
remove the parliament, once again, from any
possibility of controlling the armed forces who must
remain exclusively beholden to the executive branch.

•

To create a substantial and separate Praetorian
Guard or force that is wholly at Yeltsin's disposal and
personally subordinate to him and his retinue. They
view the threat as an internal threat to the stability of
his government, not to Russia's integrity, sovereignty,
or other vital interests.

•

To destroy, as far as possible, the MOD's central
apparatus which they are (probably rightly) convinced opposes reform and will subvert any policy
counter to its corporate interests. This also entails
fundamental reorganization of the regular armed
forces' services in order to degrade the central control
of the CINCs and their direct subordinates.

•

This reorganization entails the creation of new,
reorganized institutions to deprive the MOD of its
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powers. In effect, this means the creation of new,
extra-legal agencies of control by men Yeltsin can
trust. Thus Yeltsin reinvigorated the Defense
Inspectorate, placed Kokoshin atop it and the Defense
Council, and gave him an extensive mandate that
effectively oversees the Ministry of Defense with a
man and an agency responsible to him alone, not the
Minister of Defense and certainly not parliament.
Although Kokoshin insists that he will not administer
the armed forces, his inspectorate possesses oversight
over all armed formations, monitors compliance by
federal executive branch agencies and federal
(provincial) agencies with acts and regulations
affecting the military, including treaties. 50
This also entails continuing the tradition of Yeltsin's
idea of civilian control, i.e., he, as a civilian, controls the
military and relies on his agents to make sure nobody is
plotting a coup. In true Russian style, “mutual tattling”
replaces control by laws. 51 Thus the inspectorate, apart
from its broad powers of supervision, monitoring, and
ability to demand any and all information from the armed
forces and MOD, will be under presidential control but
operationally supervised by Yeltsin's Chief of Staff. 52
Other actual goals of the new decrees are:

•

To reduce substantially the amount of money the
government spends on defense while preserving and
equipping forces supposedly adequate to any future
challenges.

•

Allegedly to terminate the mass volunteer army
based on conscription and raise a wholly professional
new army. This goal has already been undermined.

•

As discussed later, to enrich the banking interests to
whom Chubais, Nemtsov, Baturin, etc., are closely
connected.
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•

To preserve the multiple militaries in their functions
but to bring them all supposedly under more direct
presidential control either through the Defense
Council and the commissions chaired by Chubais, or
now the General Staff, or Kokoshin's Defense Inspectorate.

•

To enrich the nuclear forces by merging the space
forces with them in order to gain access to Western
contracts for space cargoes, shuttles, space stations,
etc. which allegedly are mainly built using technologies similar to nuclear weapons. 53

Yeltsin's decrees followed much of Sergeev's agenda. He
abolished the office of Commander in Chief of the Ground
Forces, stated that the MOD's central apparatus will only be
allocated or allowed to spend 1 percent of the defense
budget, and amalgamated the Air Force and the Air Defense
Forces. Tactical Air Forces go to the Army in the six Military
Districts. Those districts will be consolidated from the
current eight districts and will now be called operationalstrategic directions. They will no longer answer to the MOD
but to their commanders. Those commanders will be
virtually autonomous in their districts regarding peacetime
training, operational plans, and mobilization of resources,
and supposedly will answer directly to the President, or
more likely the Defense Council. Strategic nuclear weapons:
ICBMs, SLBMs, space missile forces, space missile defense
troops, and air based strategic systems, presumably
including strategic ASW assets and surface vessels to
protect both the SSBNs and the hunter-killer SSNs, will be
merged into a single Strategic Nuclear Forces (S.Ya.S). The
two non-nuclear fleets, the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, will
probably be restricted to coastal defense and naval
operations in support of the army's flanks in their theaters.
However, tactical nuclear weapons, both land-based and
tactical air-based systems, will devolve to the operational
control (not release authority) of the District CINCs. In
1997 the nuclear forces are to be merged, in 1998 the air and
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air defense forces will also be amalgamated. Ultimately by
2001-2005 all forces will be grouped by the designation land,
sea, air. 54
As regards Russia's other militaries, despite Kvashnin's
postulated reform goals for them, Yeltsin has already
undermined this plan by giving the Border Troops under
General Andrei Nikolaev authority for an expanded
structure, comprising offices in Almaty, Tbilisi, and Kyiv,
and giving it a large role in Russia's foreign policy towards
its three key CIS neighbors, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and
Georgia. Indeed Nikolaev sought offices all over the CIS
only to be rebuffed by those governments. The Border
Troops are also supposed to become the major coordinator of
all forces on the borders, another bureaucratic ploy. 55 This
“reform plan” clearly contradicts the reform's stated goals,
but not Yeltsin's political proclivities. Thus this reform
must be viewed with considerable skepticism.
While the multiple militaries, MVD, FSB, Border
Troops, FAPSI, etc., will remain in their current structure,
forces taken presumably from them and the various special
forces, including but not only Spetsnaz, will be reorganized,
along with the Airborne Troops into the President's Special
Reserve or Guard that is at his disposal for emergencies.
Most likely these will be internal emergencies, including
domestic political strife, and these troops will not come
under any service or district commanders, making them a
kind of Preaetorian Guard for Yeltsin and the Defense
Council. They will thus also be removed from any
connection to the MOD and could even be used against it. 56
Yeltsin also decreed a reduction in force of 500,000 men
and the move towards professionalization, but set no date
for completing this task. Thousands of officers will be
removed, presumably given vouchers with which to buy
houses from construction companies that will be privatized
and removed from the MOD's construction and trade
organization. One can expect that given the fortunes that
can be made by contracting to build housing for them and
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their families, the big banks, along with smaller entrepreneurs, will immediately establish construction firms
who will be paid in these government vouchers that they can
redeem for cash. This will enrich the banks and other
officials' clients.
While this may be called privatization, it should be noted
that the banks will be doubly enriched due to these reforms.
Not only will they be able to redeem these vouchers for cash,
most likely the government will bypass the MOD in paying
new soldiers and officers in the districts by depositing
monies or vouchers for their upkeep in the banks which
commanders and district governors or Yeltsin's plenipotentiaries can then draw on to pay them. The banks will
charge for the services at each step of the way and reap a
fortune from the interest floated on monies deposited in
them as well as from the funds for building the houses.
Moreover, since the vouchers will devalue unless turned in
rapidly, the banks will soon harvest the cash while the
soldiers, given the ballooning arrears, will probably wait a
long time to see housing and other benefits accruing to them
upon separation from the armed forces.
And to students of Russian history this operation evokes
Tsarism's redemption payments that were imposed upon
the serfs after their emancipation in 1861. Today the
government cannot redeem military arrears and wages, or
give generous and deserved pensions to people who, after
all, risked their lives for Russia, so it gives them vouchers
with which they pay for housing, but which are really a
concealed subsidy to the banks and ultimately a return of
some monies to the government which still lacks a central
treasury and must rely on the banks to finance its
operations. And even after the government sets up its own
bank as it is supposed to do in early 1998, it is unlikely that
it will be independent of either the government, the
president, or leading factions in his entourage. That is, it,
like existing banks, will be politicized.
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Finally, nothing listed here allows for parliamentary
oversight either of the armed forces or of the financial
operations involved, so again the government will eliminate
parliamentary scrutiny further demolishing any notion of
civilian democratic control of the military. So these
operations can hardly be reckoned as strengthening either
democracy or the state's capability to govern. This scheme,
in its efforts to shove costs of provisioning and maintaining
the army onto local and regional governments, also evokes
memories of Peter the Great's more desperate (because it
was done in wartime) scheme of quartering the armed forces
on the population while his fiscal officers remorselessly
taxed everything they could think of.
The military consequences of the plan are no less
ruinous. This plan terminates all hope of strategic
coordination by professional military people, unless the
General Staff receives that function, a most unlikely
procedure since it has been made a department of the MOD.
Each District Commander will be an autocrat in charge of
his own men, training resources, and mobilization base.
There will be no practical way to coordinate training, war
plans, mobilization, or resource plans in different districts.
The central government will maintain those forces through
supposedly direct control and by fiscal levers. But given the
absence of money to pay for the reform, Moscow will
probably raise regional governments' taxes and try to force
them to pay for the armed forces. This step conforms to
Yeltsin's, Chubais', and Nemtsov's efforts to recentralize
authority at the expense of provincial and local governments while forcing the latter to pay higher taxes. 57
Russia will also be unable to plan on a national basis for
any kind of economic, military, or strategic operation.
Mobilization schedules and resources will not be
coordinated in any reasonable way. Neither will training or
manpower needs be strategically coordinated except
through the Defense Council. The role of the General Staff
remains unclear. There is no way Russia could defend itself
conventionally above the regional level, if then. Moreover,
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this conventional forces disability will last, if these plans
are implemented, at least through 2005-2007. For the next
decade, Russia will have no truly usable conventional forces
except possibly for local or regional police actions.
Thus we must confront the nuclear issue. Since tactical
and strategic nuclear weapons will be separated with the
former going to regional CINCS whose operational control
from Moscow has been considerably reduced, it is unclear if
a unified system of strategic planning for the use of nuclear
weapons or control over them can be devised. Local
commanders might obtain greater flexibility in deciding
when to use them. When one factors this disturbing
possibility into the equation that already consists of a
weakening command and control system and a launch on
warning doctrine, the results become positively alarming.
Once again the military forces needed to secure Russian
national interests are lacking as is any concept of either
those interests or the proper way to defend them. Strategy
and policy remain divorced in Russian thinking and
action.58
The regional political alternatives are no better. They
are either closer dependence of commanders upon regional
governments, thereby enhancing an existing trend, or the
incitement of a venomous competition between them for
scarce resources coming from Moscow. Neither alternative
is without serious risks to the sociopolitical stability of the
state, especially as regional commanders will garner much
more autonomy now. Thus there is a serious danger of a
further growth of regionalization here.
The Regionalist Danger and Military Reform.
The consequences of regionalization could become very
dangerous indeed for Russian security.
The whole trend of Russian politics today is decentralization.
Power is being devolved by Moscow to local mayors and
provincial governors because Moscow doesn't have the money to
support them. Roughly 20 of its 89 provinces now have power-

28

sharing treaties with Moscow, allowing them to keep much of
their tax revenue and making them each small, but
autonomous, alternative power centers. This means the
Kremlin's ability to mobilize resources to rebuild the Russian
Army diminishes with each day.59

Indeed, the regions and republics already can severely
obstruct key security policies. Chuvashiia's President
Nikolai Fedorov absolved troops in the republic from going
to Chechnya in 1995. Observers believed he did so not only
to object to the war, but also to compel Moscow to reestablish
the Council of the Heads of Republics, i.e., to “start toughly
dictating terms to the federal center.” They also viewed this
move as part of a larger effort by regional figures to remove
members of the government. 60 Regional leaders also
evidently prevailed in 1994 to cut military spending or
increase it only slightly because of their interest in cutting
spending on personnel and redirecting it to investment in
defense production and industry which brings jobs and
revenues into their bailiwicks. 61 Since the MOD and the
armed forces have sacrificed future investment to maintain
force structure and existing operational missions, this
defeat at the hands of local authorities probably had no little
impact on the armed forces' declining readiness.
On the other hand, the crisis of center-periphery
relations can also encourage potentially dangerous
symbiotic local governmental relationships with the armed
forces. Opportunistic regional politicians have formed
coalitions with the armed forces to frustrate major strategic
initiatives coming from Moscow. In 1992, Sakhalin's
Governor Valentin Fyodorov and the armed forces coalesced
to obstruct any rapprochement with Japan and the return of
the Kurile Islands to Japan. This coalition's objections
impelled Yeltsin to cancel his trip to Japan and freeze
relations with Tokyo, severely curtailing Russia's
participation in the Asia-Pacific economy and the progress
of domestic reform. 62 They established a dangerous but
abiding precedent showing Moscow's inability to control
regional governments and the armed forces who can openly
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forge political coalitions with the former against central
policies with impunity.
Indeed, precisely because Moscow has often abdicated
its responsibilities to the regions and the armed forces or
cannot fulfill them, it has frequently encouraged joint action
by regional political and military authorities. In December
1995 Kulikov requested that Stavropol's Territorial
Administration help the 54th division of MVD troops
stationed there. The unusual nature of this request led
journalist Andrei Zhukov to remark that Governor Marchenko
of Stavropol Region, the governor of “democratic Nizhny
Novgorod,” Boris Nemtsov, and the regional government in
the pro-Communist Kemerovo region were all courting the
military. As he wrote, “It is quite possible that if an
emergency situation occurs these military units will betray
their commanders in favor of the territorial administration.”63
By commanders, Zhukov clearly meant those in Moscow,
not necessarily their local commanders. Nor was Kulikov's
request unique. Grachev's remarks on his last inspection
tour in the Ural, Siberia, and Transbaikal military districts
showed the powers that regional authorities have over the
armed forces. Grachev thanked Transbaikal's local
administration for helping get food and housing for
servicemen at a most critical time. But in Siberia's case, he
noted, some local leaders ignored soldiers' interests and
pocketed the money for themselves, obstructing the
provision of basic supplies. 64
This observation points to the powers of regional
authorities vis-à-vis the armed forces on their territories.
And increasingly district commanders depend on the local
authorities for resources. This dependence is mutual since
they depend on the military for ultimate order. Thus the
army commanders also hold some trumps. In an interview,
Col. General Viktor Andreyevich Kopylov, CINC of the
Siberian Military District remarked that the district
contains 42 percent of all military industry in Russia and
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has troops deployed in Omsk, Novosibirsk, Tomsk, and
Kemerovo Oblasts, Krasnoyarsk and Altay Krays, and the
republics of Tuva, Khakass, and Altay. 65 Similarly, in 1995,
Grachev proposed restructuring the Moscow military
district so it would become an elite formation.
Autonomy presupposes that the district will exercise its own
command and control of troops, provide its own
communications and rear services support, and have its own
paymaster for officers and enlisted men. The pay issue alone
could create tendencies toward autonomy within
other envious military districts.66

Moscow's weakness fosters strong incentives among
local civilian and military leaders to come together to defend
their autonomy or to act autonomously, even against or
without Moscow. Because Moscow has conspicuously failed
to provide for its soldiers' and officers' needs, both necessity
and central encouragement have led officers and regional
authorities to work with each other to supply those needs,
often bypassing Moscow. Since the regions can withhold tax
revenues from Moscow for use at home, they possess real
resources with which to buy support. 67
While the internal fractures among the armed forces
militate against a coup by a serving officer, there are several
real dangers in the current situation. A regional or central
leader may use the armed forces who support him in a bid
for power or secession. In that case, polls conducted among
army officers reveal that a large majority of them oppose
using the army for internal purposes like stopping a
province's secession. 68 That finding raises the danger that
some military forces will go over to the secessionist side or
rebel against Moscow if a coup or another misconceived war
like that against secessionist Chechnya is launched there.
Alternatively a commander could begin conducting his
own foreign policy, e.g., the Border Troops, who now have
official authority to act abroad, or he and/or the political
leader could create their own military-police forces from
official and paramilitary forces. In multiethnic areas, like
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the North Caucasus, the potential for an Algerian like
scenario, reminiscent of the French forces in Algeria, 195462 could also develop. 69 In short, there are numerous
dangers that could result from the preexisting regionalism
and from trends towards regionalism in the new decrees
that could be exploited for regionalist objectives.
Another military danger results from the inchoate
structure of the state administration. A 1996 analysis of the
state's structure concluded that despite Moscow's so-called
new policies,
The Russian Federation will remain a complex federatedunitary state with different systems of administration in
different territories (okrugs, republics, and oblasts or krays)
and different relationships between these territories and the
center until 2000—until the end of the new president's term.70

This administrative diversity, if not chaos, is found in
the structure of the military districts which has not changed
since 1991 and which remains amorphous and normatively
undefined. 71 Absent the rule of law or conformity of Russia's
regional economic structure to that of the military districts,
over 30 different military organizations: Border Troops,
MVD Internal Troops, Russia's Ministry for Civil Defense
and Emergencies, etc. have unilaterally formed their own
districts and regional centers that do not correspond to each
other's borders or the existing administrative system. 72 As
military districts fulfill vital administrative, military,
operational, and mobilization tasks, they cannot currently
coordinate among themselves or with civil authorities to
effectively fulfill their responsibilities. 73
Since military districts do not conform to the economic
principles according to which Yeltsin is reorganizing local
government, failure to reverse this situation will gravely
disrupt civilian-military interaction. Because all current
military districts are effectively first echelon and border
troop districts, this lack of coordination among military
organizations and with the economic administration
emanating from Moscow constitutes a grave risk to security
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in a military conflict. This absence of coordination among
the army and the MVD's troops has been a constant
throughout the war in Chechnya. 74
Therefore, the author of this Russian report decries the
independent creation of new districts by what are
essentially former internal districts that lack the needed
infrastructures, airfields, C 2 facilities, operating areas,
depots, etc. Instead the state must create a new military
administrative system to realize civilian-military and interservice coordination realities and provide for effective
command, control, and deployment of military assets. 75
Obviously Kvashnin has a real point, for all his turfgrabbing.
But as long as Moscow cannot frame coherent regional
policies and create a stable legal basis for Russian
federalism and for the armed forces' military administrative structure, further breakdowns like Chechnya's are all
too likely and/or the necessary administrative coordination
will not take place. For this reason Yeltsin, Chubais, and
Nemtsov are steadily attacking the regional governors in an
effort to recentralize power in Moscow and deprive them of
autonomy.
Final Notes on the Reform Plan.
While this reform plan is clever with ulterior political
and financial motives, the foregoing shows that it is also a
recipe for strategic and military disaster by people who are
seriously deficient in understanding military issues. The
already large gap between objectives and capabilities is
widening not shrinking. Furthermore because the national
command structures and their politicization of the MOD,
General Staff, and the multiple militaries are not
addressed, this is in reality only a reform of the armed forces
(Reforma Vooruzhenykh Sil'), not a true military reform
(Voennaya Reforma) in the sense of past Russian historical
reforms. God alone knows what will come of this melange of
graft, opportunism, strategic ignorance and regression to
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Tsarist models. But if a serious attempt is made to
implement this sham reform, we can be reasonably certain
that Russia will continue to be anything but a stable,
democratic partner. The status quo is already not holding,
as this series of decrees shows us. The question then
becomes, what structure will be the next to buckle and what
happens then?
Information Warfare.
Russia's failure to confront such strategic realities as
inconventional and nuclear warfare also appears with
regard to thinking about future war, namely Information
Warfare. Russian writers on this subject are as interesting
and visionary as their predecessors in the 1970s and 1980s
in writing about the RMA, or in the 1920s and 1930s about
future wars. Indeed, Soviet writers coined the term
“revolution in military affairs” and greatly developed the
concept before U.S. writers and officers appropriated it. 76
Russian writers have a much broader definition or notion of
information warfare than do American writers. They
include warfare targeted against the minds and physiques
of enemy combatants and even of whole societies. They see
this form of warfare as ushering in a new series of weapons
or technologies that can strike enemies in wholly new way
including biological or psychotropic weapons. 77
Many commentators, civilian and military officials, e.g.
former Chief of Staff Col. General Viktor Samsonov,
contend that IW proceeds during peacetime. Some are
clamoring for a new definition of war to include this kind of
bloodless, peacetime campaign against key political and
informational strategic targets. Allegedly Russia has, for
several years, been in an information war with the United
States and the West. Moreover, Russia is losing or lost that
war. Its domestic anomie and loss of values reflect the
West's successful targeting of the Russian media who, it is
said, have then betrayed Russia as servants of the West. 78
Echoes of this doctrine appear in the new, 1997 security
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doctrine that stresses internal threats, including threats to
Russia's spirituality, morale, and moral integrity. 79 Other
officials, like Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, evoke
threats to Russia's intellectual, communications, or
information space. 80 The discussion about an intellectual or
ideological threat is pervasive, even if assessments vary.
While this discourse of informational threat reflects
Russia's profound disenchantment, it does not necessarily
entail the sense of being presently in an information or
psychological war.
But those disaffected elites who believe this war is
occurring are updating Lenin's notion of constant political
or ideological warfare with the West to our time and openly
raising the Leninist-Stalinist notion of internal enemies.
Political opposition equates with sabotage and opens the
way to a domestic war. War at home and war abroad could
become a seamless web. The ties of office, political power,
access to military, paramilitary, and/or private armed
forces and media outlets on the part of almost all of the key
players make it clear that any major political initiative,
even merely a personnel reshuffle, means a bitter struggle
among both the possessors of armed force and the media
barons. Often they are the same persons or factions.
Internal wars and purges could easily take place if the
fragile political system collapses due to elite fragmentation
or falls into the opposition's hands. Many oppositionists are
particularly attracted to this notion of contemporary
politics and warfare.
If the trend towards bitter elite fragmentation combines
with the aforementioned privatization of violence, the
consequences are utterly unpredictable. The fall, 1997
struggle between the rival forces of Boris Berezovsky,
former Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, and
Chubais and Nemtsov, was accurately labeled an information war in Russia. 81 Things could easily degenerate further
before improving, leading to the real thing, not just a media
war. In other words, as Russia's own power struggle
remains unconsummated and perhaps is entering a new
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and dangerous phase, one or more groups may try to use the
media and other channels of information to exploit this
alleged external danger or threat for purely domestic
purposes connected with taking power.
Information technology could thus tremendously
expand the scope for political and military conflict beyond
anything we can envision, targeting whole sectors of
societies through what used to be called “the hidden
persuaders.” Current U.S. boasting about this capability
betrays a touching innocence about its strategic potentialities in troubled societies and about the nature of war in
general. 82 Such bragging only fuels Russian paranoia. But
these new weapons could, in the Russian definition, include
whole series of biological or psychotropic weapons, or simply
novel uses of information and other technologies to
destabilize a society from within. And Russia is still
building or devising biological and chemical weapons which
could play an enormous role in this context. For us there is
the warning that we must renounce our ingrained
ethnocentrism and realize that for other cultures,
information warfare, as they understand it, is a radical,
even revolutionary development that puts their whole
society at risk and makes it the center of gravity. We ignore
these considerations at our peril.
Conclusions.
While this is not the whole story of Russian writing on
IW, when taken in tandem with the other developments
outlined here, it is only one of all too many grounds for alarm
about Russia today and tomorrow. Russia is not a
democratic state, and arguably is not moving further
towards democracy. Neither is it stable or predictable. Its
strategic mechanisms are flimsy and ephemeral. Its armed
forces cannot defend against threats to Russia but may be
quite useful for internal coups or insurgencies. Its doctrine
and strategy place an inordinate stress on nuclear scenarios
without the means to control them. And the opportunities
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presented by IW are beyond Russia due to socio-economic
constraints and the failure of military reform. Or else they
open up radical and terrifying prospects for mass domestic
warfare of a new type having terrifying vistas for future
conflicts.
Meanwhile, Russian national security is endangered by
this haphazard effort at reform and Yeltsin's merely
sporadic interest in military issues except when there is a
threat to his authority or a grave crisis. But such reform
needs continual leadership. Russia faces block obsolescence
of its technology and weapons unless the economy and the
state's leadership of it are rejuvenated and military affairs
are funded rationally, not by irrational fiat. It is also clear
that the enormous bureaucratic infighting and obstacles to
a coherent and rational national security policy and the
mentality of elites who still wish for defense on all azimuths
must be overcome. The continuation of the Soviet mentality
is breeding yet another nightmare for the army and the
country. Soviet propaganda used to say the army and the
people are one. Is it not true then that their crises are also
one?
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